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Introduction 
Economic theory argues for free and unrestricted international trade on the basis 
that world society is best served through resource use efficiency associated with 
exploitation of the comparative advantage of each participant in world markets. 
Analysts use the comparative advantage criterion to evaluate and prescribe the 
trade policy of individual nations. Policies which interfere with or prevent the 
exploitation of comparative advantage are deemed socially undesirable. Policies 
which enhance or encourage specialization and trade consistent with the 
comparative advantage criterion are viewed as efficient and desirable. For 
example, Anderson has used this criterion in assessing existing agricultural trade 
policy for the Republic of Korea. He further uses this analysis of comparative 
advantage dynamics to prescribe some general policy recommendations. 
While comparative advantage is certainly a valuable analytical precept, it is 
in most cases only a starting point and not the only possible policy assessment 
criterion. Strict application of the comparative advantage criterion suffers from 
the inability to fully appreciate and account for costs of a prescribed free trade 
policy or nonmarket or noneconomic benefits from a trade protectionist policy. 
This shortcoming is particularly evident when one attempts to apply a strict 
comparative advantage based evaluation of agricultural trade policy in a rapidly 
developing country, such as the Republic of Korea. This paper is intended to 
briefly review some of the nonmarket or noneconomic costs, benefits, and 
considerations which should be kept in mind when assessing agricultural trade 
policy. The Republic of Korea (henceforth referred to as Korea) is used as a 
representative case. 
There is ample evidence to suggest that Korea's comparative advantage rests 
with an abundance of labour as an input into labour intensive manufacturing 
(Anderson; Clark; and Westphal). Moreover, Korea has an apparent comparative 
disadvantage in the production of rQany if not most agricultural products (Jun). 
Application of strict economic efficiency criteria would suggest that Korea 
should focus its efforts on expansion of labour intensive exports to trade for 
agricultural and food product imports. However, a more complete view of the 
socioeconomic and political complexity of Korea provides an explanation if not 
a justification for protectionist policy philosophy with respect to Korea's 
domestic agriculture. 
Security and Food Self-Sufficiency 
Even the most casual observer in Korea is struck by the intensity with which 
national security is pursued. There is a clear sense that Korea sees itself as an 
island in a potentially hostile neighbourhood. To the north is the 40-year enemy, 
the Democratic People's Republic of China. To the west is the giant People's 
Republic of China. To the east is Japan, an economic ally, but also a nation 
whose 35-year occupation of Korea has left a legacy of animosity and distrust. 
The need to be prepared to go it alone if necessary places a high premium on 
self-sufficiency. As Whang (p. 93) points out, "The supply of food, in broad 
terms, comes from two major sources: domestic production and imports from 
abroad, including foreign aid, but the import of food would not be favourable to 
the country in the long run because of the accumulated burden of foreign 
exchange and national security considerations. The main emphasis of any policy 
concerned with food supply must be the maximization of domestic production." 
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Each of Korea's 5-year plans has included a reference regarding the need to 
pursue food self-sufficiency. Yet over the past two decades Korea has failed to 
achieve this goal (table 1). While holding its own in rice, meat, and pulses, 
Korean agriculture has not been able to meet domestic demand for wheat and 
barley. Moreover, where self-sufficiency has been attained, it has been heavily 
influenced by programs to limit domestic demand. 
Table 1. Korea Self-Sufficiency Ratio in Certain Agricultural Commodities 
Year 
Commodity 1962 1968 1970 1975 1977 1979 
All cereals 0.92 0.88 o. 77 o. 71 0. 70 0.63 
Wheat and 
barley 0.68 0. 72 0.66 0.47 0.04 0.08 
Rice 1.02 0.93 0.84 0.91 1.00 1.00 
Pulses 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.96 
Beef 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 
Pork 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Between 1970 and 1979, aggregate consumption of pork increased by 54 
percent, beef by 30 percent, and rice by 18 percent. Over the same period, 
combined wheat and barley consumption increased by 523 percent. Korean 
consumption apparently shifted towards products supplied in excess in world 
markets, specifically cereal grains. 
Past failures to achieve greater food self-sufficiency have resulted from: the 
shift in comparative advantage away from agriculture, U.S. promotion and 
concessional food sales programmes, and conflicting economic objectives which 
give rise to inconsistent agricultural and food policies. 
The 1970s saw solid and consistent economic growth in Korea. Gross national 
product increased at an average annual rate of 10.9 percent. Much of this 
growth was fueled by expansion of the labour intensive export oriented 
manufacturing sector (shoes, textiles, electronics, etc.). However, as the Korean 
case indicates, sustaining growth in that sector requires a reliable supply of low 
priced food sufficient to feed a rapidly urbanizing labour force. 
The most desired method of meeting urban food needs is through increased 
domestic production. Korea has pursued a variety of policies aimed at 
increasing agricultural output. These efforts met (and are meeting) with 
reasonable success. Between 1963 and 1973, agricultural output increased by an 
average annual rate of 2.23 percent. Between 1973 and 1977, this rate was 8.81 
percent (Ban, p. 2). This has been accomplished at least in part through 
government sponsored research and development efforts and subsidies for 
productive inputs such as fertilizer. 
Still, to meet the growing food needs of the urban population, agricultural 
imports increased substantially. For example, between 1962 and 1979, net cereal 
imports rose by more than 900 percent, from 0.5 million metric tons to 4.8 
million metric tons. Virtually all these imports came from the United States, 
much of it under P.L. 480 subsidy programmes. 
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Limitation of domestic demand, government promot10n of domestic pro-
duction, and more careful control of food imports are three elements in Korea's 
trade and agricultural policy complex which are likely to be more intensively 
pursued in the coming years. Protectionist policies designed to minimize 
reliance on food imports may be explained in part by the high priority placed on 
self-sufficiency as part of Korea's intense national security concern. As Kim (p. 
37) points out in conjunction with a discussion on the food security issue, 
"International trade policies on agricultural products should be carefully planned 
in harmony with domestic farm production and income policies .. .In particular, 
increases in the import of agricultural products, which are competitive with the 
domestic production, need to be gradual so as to avoid an abrupt impact on the 
farm economy." 
The Rural Equity Issue: Saemaul Undong 
While this low cost source of supplemental food contributed to development in 
the manufacturing sector, it served to depress farm prices and, in turn, farm 
incomes. As a result, the agricultural sector and rural Korea failed to fully 
participate in rising Korean prosperity (Jun, p. 3). Between 1955 and 1977, 
agriculture's share of the gross national product declined from 46 percent to less 
than 20 percent (Moon, p. 157). Between 1970 and 1975, the industrial wage rate 
increased at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent while agricultural wages 
increased by 1.5 percent. 
In recent years, the Korean government has become increasingly aware of 
economic disparity between urban and rural dwellers. As a partial remedy, the 
government under President Park initiated Saemaul Undong--the new village 
movement--in 1971. The commitment to the spirit of this project has been 
reaffirmed by the government of President Chun. 
Saemaul Undong includes a number of projects intended to improve the quality 
of life in rural areas. While Saemaul Undong has, at least partially, succeeded 
in bringing modern services to rural Korea, it has become increasingly clear that 
the state of the rural economy will not improve significantly until prosperity 
comes to agriculture. 
Most observers agree that farm incomes can be enhanced through a 
combination of: improvement in production technology and farm prices. It is 
likely that each will require continued government participation (and inter-
vention). Thus if the government 'is to succeed in its commitment to rural 
development, it may be necessary to protect farm producers from import 
competition, and to encourage production of import substitutes. 
Further, improvement in the agricultural economy is important in regulating 
rural-urban migration. At the outset of the industrialization process, growth in 
the urban population was necessary in order to provide factories with large 
quantities of low cost labour. However, as economic growth has moved toward 
more capital intensive industry, the need for expanding supplies of industrial 
labour has abated. Korea is reaching the point where additions to the urban 
population are creating an economic and social drag in excess of the incremental 
benefit. Moreover, the outmigration of rural labour, particularly young workers, 
has adversely affected agricultural development. As Moon (p. 161) points out, 
the farm labour force has become increasingly older and female. 
Increased farm income can serve to slow or even reverse the flows of 
population to the cities, thus relieving pressure on urban services. Si-
multaneously, agricultural productivity can be improved if the young and 
educated are encouraged to stay on the farm. 
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Balance of Payments, Foreign Exchange, and Vital Imports 
The agricultural trade policy of Korea cannot be evaluated independently of the 
larger complex of trade issues and realities. As suggested previously, Korea is 
a relatively high cost producer of many agricultural commodities. The 
comparative advantage criterion would suggest that Korea relies more on low 
price food imports. However, food importation requires an expenditure of 
foreign exchange reserves. In the Korean case, priorities for expenditures of 
foreign exchange dictate that commitment to agricultural imports be limited. 
The Korean industrial sector relies completely on imported petroleum. The 
growth of industry has been accompanied by parallel growth in the importation 
of oil __ (see table 2). Moreover, the precipitous rise in world oil prices in the late 
1970s places a severe burden on foreign exchange reserves. Between 1962 and 
1979, Korean expenditures on petroleum imports increased by 248 times. 
Further, Korea ceased to be eligible to purchase food with soft currency under 
the U.S. P.L. 480 programme in the late 1970s. Thus food imports demand hard 
currency expenditures. In order to maintain petroleum import levels to meet 
industry's needs, foreign exchange commitments to other import products such 
as food must be limited. In a sense, the demand for agricultural imports 
becomes unit elastic, in that the foreign exchange commitment to food imports 
is controlled so as to maintain liquidity to purchase oil. Thus when market 
prices for food imports rise, the Korean government may find it necessary to 
restrict purchases. 
Table 2. Value of Korean Imports of Petroleum, 1964-1979 
Year Imports Year Imports Mil. U.S.$ Mil. U.S.$ 
1964 12.5 1972 206.3 
1965 23. 7 1873 274.5 
1966 29.8 1974 965.8 
1967 38.0 1975 1,271.2 
1968 70. 7 1976 1,609.3 
1969 98. 7 1977 1,931.3 
1970 118.9 1978 2,190.1 
1971 178.8 1979 3,103. 7 
Korea can produce food domestically even though the resource cost is 
relatively high. However, no domestic oil production is possible. Thus, if Korea 
is to exercise its comparative advantage in manufacturing, it must maintain 
stable supplies of imported petroleum. To do so it may be necesary to pursue 
a protectionist policy in trade in products (in this case food) for which Korea 
suffers a comparative disadvantage. 
The strict comparative advantage free trade doctrine fails to appreciate 
problems associated with limited access to hard currencies. Free trade cannot 
occur in a world where certain currencies are not fully acceptable for 
transactions. 
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Food Imports and the Traditional Diet 
The traditional diet is a component in the Korean culture. Moreover, many 
Koreans view the traditional diet as nutritionally superior to western alter-
natives. Heavy reliance on imports, however, can lead to changes in diet, as 
suggested earlier by the shift in consumption toward wheat and barley products. 
Individual importing nations cannot, through the excercise of demand in the 
world market, influence the mix of food products made available by exporting 
countries. That is to say small importing countries are forced to take what is 
made available by large exporters. Often what is available is surplus production 
aimed primarily at domestic markets. Thus Korea's reliance on the United 
States for food supplies may lead to the westernization of the Korean diet. The 
social value associated with the preservation of tradition cannot be assessed in 
strict comparative advantage terms. 
Conclusions 
This paper reviewed concerns and considerations which serve to explain why a 
country such as Korea might pursue protectionist policies in agriculture even 
when confronted by a substantial comparative disadvantage. In the Korean 
example, a number of nonmarket and noneconomic factors combine to create a 
strong incentive for government intervention on behalf of domestic agriculture. 
What should be obvious to the reader is that the Korean society, and thus the 
Korean government, is faced with often contradictory policy goals. The need for 
elastic supplies of low priced food to support industrial development may run 
counter to the desire to attain self-sufficiency for national security purposes. 
Further, foreign exchange considerations may lead to policies which intend to 
minimize expenditures on food imports so as to maintain liquidity for purchasing 
vital petroleum imports. Also, cultural concerns may lead to resistance to diet 
changes associated with food importation. 
Korea was used as an illustrative case partly because it is an economy and 
society in transition. As it moves rapidly into the developed world, Korea faces 
many of the stresses associated with maintaining a level of distribution of 
income gains between the urban industrial and rural agricultural sectors. Both 
equity and political considerations require that policy address this dilemma. 
It should be noted, however, that conditions in Korea are not wholly unlike 
those in other small developing nations. Jabara and Thompson (p. 197), in their 
analysis of Senegal's agricultural trade policy, conclude " ... that a country may 
be better off at a more diversified position than would be prescribed by a 
conventional cost analysis ... free, undistorted trade may not be the best policy 
for all small countries to follow." The implication of this discussion is that 
economists, in the effort to assess and advise on matters of agricultural trade 
policies, must temper their strict comparative advantage analysis with a 
complete understanding of the myriad of social and economic conditions and 
goals in the country in question. The methodology of economics must be adapted 
so as to explicitly account for noneconomic or nonmarket costs and benefits. 
The traditional methodology of the economist can be used as no more than a 
starting point in such an undertaking. 
Note 
lM. V. Martin and J. A. MacDonald are Associate Professor and Graduate 
Research Assistant, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
Oregon State University. S. H. Huh is Senior Research Fellow, Korea Rural 
Economics Institute. 
286 
References 
Anderson, K., "Changing Comparative Advantage in Agriculture: Theory and 
Pacific Basin Experience," Journal of Rural Development, Vol. III, No. 2, 
Dec. 1980. 
Ban, S. H., "The Growth of Agricultural Output and Productivity in Korea, 
1918-1978," Journal of Rural Development, Vol. IV, No. 1, June 1981. 
Clark, C., "Agricultural Adoption in an Advanced Economy," Journal of Rural 
Development, Vol. II, No. 1, April 1979. 
Jabara, C. L. and Thompson, R. L., "Agricultural Comparative Advantage Under 
International Price Uncertainty: The Case of Senegal," American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, No. 2, May 1980. 
Jun, J. K., "Achievements and Failures of the Korean Economy in the 1970s," 
Korean Journal, Jan. 1980. 
Kim, D. J., "Issues and Strategies for Agricultural Growth in Korea," 
Journal of Rural Development, Vol. II, No. 1, April 1979. 
Moon, P.-Y., "Selected Issues in the Impact of Industrialization of Agriculture 
in Korea," Journal of Rural Development, Vol. II, No. 2, Nov. 1979. 
Westphal, L. E., "The Republic of Korea's Experience with Export Led 
Industrial Development," World Bank Reprint Series, No. 6, 1978. 
Whang, 1.-J., "An Integrated Perspective of Food Policies: Identification of 
Policy Alternatives," Journal of Rural Development, Vol. II, No. 1, April 
1979. 
287 
OPENER'S REMARKS-Eric Monke 
The papers presented in this session provide three very different views on the 
role of international trade in the development process and on the importance of 
comparative advantage and economic efficiency in the evaluation of policy. 
O'Hagan et al. argue that production policies should proceed on the basis of 
domestic consumption requirements and the desire for self-sufficiency. Martin 
et al. suggest that such nonefficiency arguments allow the policymaker to ignore 
the dictates of comparative advantage. Koester's study of the EC sugar market 
provides an empirical assessment of the tradeoffs between efficiency and 
nonefficiency objectives of policy. My remarks attempt to focus on the policy 
related aspects of the papers. 
The "trade as residual" approach is provided by the FAQ projections exercise 
(AT 2000). Income and population growth generate increased demand, production 
increases are limited by land and water availabilities, and international trade 
fills the gap. The results are interesting and refreshing for they suggest that 
the global availability of fixed factors of production (land and water) is 
sufficient to allow rapid growth in production and volume of trade. But whether 
these results have any necessary implications for economic policy at the national 
level depends very much on views of the role of international trade and world 
prices. Contrary to the AT 2000 view, I would argue that changes in agricultural 
policies and patterns of production will flow from international as well as 
domestic market incentives. If real prices of grain do not increase, as assumed 
in the F AO study, there seems little in the way of political motivation or 
economic rationale which would require a country to plunge into self-sufficiency 
program mes and make major new investments in institutional services, agri-
cultural research and development, or land development. If world grain prices 
do increase, production responses are likely to vary substantially by country and 
commodity. Production input costs--particularly land, water, and capital--are 
not equal across countries, and it is impossible in the context of an aggregate 
study to identify the best use for fixed factors of production. There is little 
reason to expect the set of best alternatives to be restricted to cerea~s. 
In short, policy recommendations do not follow from projections exercises. 
Policy prescriptions may be consistent with such work, but they would be 
appropriate only by accident. Capt:ial requirements, for example, do not require 
foreign assistance as AT 2000 implies. Reforms in domestic capital markets 
which provide positive real rates of interest to rural savers, and access to formal 
lending institutions by rural borrowers may be the keys to increased capital 
formation in agriculture. Similarly, projections exercises cannot justify 
nutritional programmes, land reform policies, or the maintenance of concessional 
cereal exports by developed countries. 
Policy recommendations instead require a detailed evaluation of prospective 
costs and benefits which result from the encouragement of particular tech-
nologies, commodities, or institutions. These evaluations depend on prices of 
resources, not simply potential availabilities. The contribution of international 
trade to this evaluation process is the provision of an alternative set of prices 
for outputs and intermediate inputs. Selection of prices which are indicative of 
longrun market conditions is no simple task, but the principle of comparative 
advantage suggests that the evaluation exercise is more appropriate when done 
with world prices. The major reason for this result is that comparative 
advantage maximizes the consumption possibilities of domestic factors of 
production. 
Martin et al. indicate that the benefits of economic activities cannot be 
entirely captured by efficiency related prices. I doubt that analysts of 
comparative advantage would disagree with this principle. But the presence of 
nonefficiency objectives in no way diminishes the importance of comparative 
advantage analyses. The discovery of comparative disadvantage in a particular 
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activity does not imply that encouragement of the activity is wrong. Rather, 
such findings indicate that encouragement of the activity imposes efficiency 
costs on the economy. The measurement of these costs provides valuable 
information to policymakers because it allows assessment of the value of 
nonefficiency objectives. Self-sufficiency in grain production may be an 
important objective, for example, but unless economic resources are in infinite 
supply and real income levels are irrelevant to policymakers, increases in self-
sufficiency ratios cannot ignore resultant eocnomic costs. "Self-sufficiency no 
matter what the cost" may be a political rallying cry, but the slogan has little 
credence in a world of scarce resources, low incomes, and government budget 
constraints. Regardless of objective, efficiency costs are relevant to the 
policymaking process. 
Koester's study of the EC sugar market provides an elegant example of the 
use of efficiency costs in the evaluation of nonefficiency objectives. World 
prices for sugar do not represent the right price, but a feasible alternative to 
existing EC market prices. Feasible alternatives create efficiency costs if the 
alternative is not exploited. Koester estimates these efficiency costs, but also 
addresses the nonefficiency objective of income distribution which motivated the 
distortions in efficiency. As Koester shows, income distributional objectives are 
not served by the sugar policy, and thus it becomes difficult to justify the 
efficiency costs on the basis of the stated nonefficiency objective. 
While noneconomic objectives are important to the design and analysis of 
economic policy, care must be exercised in the identification of objectives. For 
example, Martin et al. argue that foreign exchange availability and balance of 
payments positions represent potential arguments against the relevance of 
comparative advantage analysis. This argument is incorrect. On the contrary, 
consideration of foreign exchange impacts lies at the heart of comparative 
advantage analysis. Calculation of comparative advantage depends on the 
relationship between value added, measured at world prices, and the costs of 
domestic factors (land, labour, and capital), measured at their opportunity costs. 
The key point is that opportunity costs are defined in terms of foreign exchange 
earning power. Unemployed factors have zero opportunity cost, but employed 
factors must be withdrawn from activities which already earn or save foreign 
exchange. (Nontraded goods complicate the argument somewhat, but do not 
obviate the principle.) If the opportunity costs of domestic factors exceed value 
added, then the activity under study diminishes rather than increases foreign 
exchange availability, and the country lacks comparative advantage in the new 
activity. For example, if value added in a new rice production activity was 
US$300 per metric ton, but the domestic factors required to produce one metric 
ton of rice could earn $400 if employed in coffee and cocoa produciton, then 
encouragement of rice production will diminish rather than increase foreign 
exchange availabilities. In short, import substitution will not always save foreign 
exchange. If the activity does save foreign exchange, it will demonstrate 
comparative advantage. Thus foreign exchange and balance of payments 
considerations cannot be considered as nonefficiency objectives. 
Free trade in agricultural products is neither likely nor necessarily optimal, 
and there is little in comparative advantage analyses which requires free trade. 
Rather comparative advantage recognizes that international trade provides 
marketing opportunities for agricultural producers additional to domestic 
opportunities, and thus may represent sources of increased income. Attempts to 
develop policies which ignore these opportunities imply that absolute income 
levels have no linkages to the process of economic development. It is difficult 
to imagine that many agricultural producers would share such a view. 
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OPENER'S REMARKS-W. J. Anderson 
AT 2000 sets out the world food requirements in cold numbers along with 
estimates of the inputs required to achieve secular growth of 3. 7 percent per 
year in food supply. These numbers reveal the formidable task faced by the 
world to adequately nourish its population. AT 2000 is primarily a study of 
growth and its implications, but the equity dimension of the theme of this 
Conference also stands out in the estimates of the number of undernourished 
persons in the world now and by 2000. The reduction in those numbers must be 
the most fundamental goal to seek in the pursuit of equity. The trend growth 
scenario results in 590 million undernourished persons in 2000, an increase of 35 
percent over 1975; the high growth scenario would reduce the undernourished 
population by 33 percent, bringing the number down to 260 million, which is still 
large in absolute terms and far from fulfilling minimum equity requirements. 
The choice of the GDP growth rate of 7 percent per year as the target is 
certainly the maximum likely to be achieved. On the other hand, it seems to 
be the minimum rate that will make some headway in the reduction in the 
number of undernourished persons. The input requirements that go with 
increasing agricultural growth from the current 3 percent per year to 3. 7 
percent in the developing countries are impressive: rainfed cropland-21 percent 
per year; irrigated cropland--55; cropping intensity--21; yields--70; invest-
ment--4.4; and fertilizer--8.1. These numbers suggest that to achieve the high 
growth target, both developing and industrialized nations will have to con-
centrate on the economic dimensions of the political economy equation for 
development policy. 
For the developing countries this means supporting food production in a 
positive way and avoiding well intentioned discrimination in favour of consumer 
interests and urban industrial development: (1) adopt policies which cause 
capital to flow into food production and support agriculture with investments in 
the infrastructure; (2) where exports are an important part of agriculture's 
output, limit taxation to ensure incentive prices to producers and adequate 
revenue to purchase yield increasing inputs and to leave some economic rent in 
the agricultural sector; (3) maintain a realistic foreign exchange rate--the 
tendency to overvalue the currency cheapens food imports and underprices local 
food products; and (4) provide a mega-increase in research and extension--the 
observation in the paper that only 20 percent of the world's expenditure on 
research takes place in the developing countries where 80 percent of the 
increase in world demand will accrue indicates the need for this essential 
ingredient for growth. In the economic history of agriculture in the now 
industrialized nations, the growth rate was much higher after 1913 when 
research and the application of research results played a major role in expanding 
output and reducing input-output ratios. 
A significant result of both the high growth and the trend scenarios is the 
increase in net cereal imports; these amounts would double under the high 
growth scenario and quadruple if the trend scenario prevails. This outlook puts 
the cereal exporting industrialized countries on the spot. Those countries eager 
for this trade have to realize that restriction of reciprocal trade with the 
developing world suppresses growth, serves to maintain international inequities, 
and jeopardizes their own interest in cereal sales. Certainly a liberal approach 
to trade must be supplemented by capital and technological transfers through aid 
programmes, but industrialized nations cannot limit their responsibilities for 
world economic development to such transfers. 
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The other two papers record what policies two nations have actually 
adopted--one, a developing nation, Korea, the other an industrialized region, the 
European Community. 
Korea, in spite of an adequate labour supply available to produce labour 
intensive exports, and a comparative disadvantage in food production, chose the 
goal of self-sufficiency for its food policy. The reasons are: security--Korea 
lives in a "potentially hostile neighbourhood," and Korea imports oil to fuel its 
industrial growth, a requirement which competes with food imports for foreign 
exchange. 
Under those circumstances, cereals offered at concessional prices under P .L. 
480 look attractive but they interfere with the goal of self-sufficiency. Internal 
agricultural commodity prices which need to rise to overcome the comparative 
disadvantage are prevented from doing so. Moreover, the policy is inequitable 
because the rural community does not ,share the growing national prosperity, and 
urban welfare is enhanced by low food prices. So policy has to shift to input 
subsidies and rural programmes to enhance the quality of life and keep the rural-
urban migration within the bounds of industrial absorption of labour. 
In the case of the European Community's sugar protocol, the author analyzes 
th2 working out of a protectionist policy which has made the EC self-sufficient 
in sugar but has been modified to offer preferential access to .certain developing 
countries. To make it up to the poorer nations, the rich country hands out 
quotas which provide a market for the amount of the quota at higher than world 
prices and therefore constitute an income transfer to the developing countries. 
The results, however, are weird. While these preferences are granted in the 
name of equity, the EC has to reexport the amount of the quotas. Therefore 
importers of sugar, rich or poor, benefit from lower world prices, and the nations 
receiving the trade preferences suffer a negative welfare change which offsets 
some of the income transfer. The net benefits fall randomly and capriciously 
over a range of 22 percent of GDP for Mauritius to a negative amount in the 
case of India. 
I have a few concluding remarks. Although I have taken the results of AT 
2000 from which to draw inferences, I would have felt easier if I could have seen 
the results of one or two price scenarios. Relative prices are not neutral in the 
real world as the model supposes, and changes in them can have a marked effect 
on output, as other papers have shown. The need to examine the price scenarios 
is the more vital because the results suggest that the terms of trade for food 
commodities will increase because of demand-supply interaction under either 
hi[;h growth or trend scenarios. 
The magnitude of the task implicit in the high growth scenario will strain the 
resources of the world and challenge policymakers to orient policies to minimize 
economic distortions. A host of political considerations looms before policy-
makers in every country in the world, to which the Korean and EC papers 
testify. 
In making a judgment on what can be accomplished in agricultural growth over 
a 25-year period, one also has to take into account the impact of risk and 
instability caused by shocks to the economy and overreaction to supply and 
demand shifts. The evidence from an earlier paper at this Conference was that 
agricultural growth in some now industrialized countries has followed anything 
but a smooth course. 
The results from AT 2000 modified by political considerations and instability 
suggest that the world will have to settle for no more than the medium growth 
rate rather than high growth in the developing world. In that case, the number 
of undernourished in the population will be about the same as today. It seems 
to me that growth policies will have to be accompanied by a good deal of 
attention to equity considerations. 
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RAPPORTEUR'S REPORT-Robert W. Bohall 
O'Hagan et al. 's Paper 
The trend scenario assumes no negative rates of growth in production. This 
could occur with political unrest, with resulting famine. Is F AO overly 
optimistic in its predictions? FAQ forecasts assume fivefold increases in energy 
and irrigation inputs. However, a previous paper argued that energy and 
irrigation may decline. There is also the possibility of a shift to low input 
technology and a decrease in farm size with population growth. Has F AO taken 
these into account? Is the assumption of constant real prices reasonable? Is the 
situation as bad as suggested? F AO data for developing countries do not always 
reflect true production due to underreporting; an error of up to 100 percent is 
possible. Is it better to look to the past 10 years than to use trends to predict 
to the year 2000? Do problems not arise in taking GDP growth as an exogenous 
determinant of future demand when agricultural production is an element in 
GDP? The authors replied that there may be some increase in real agricultural 
prices over the next 10 years, but the authors predicted relative stability. 
Regarding comment on declining energy and irrigation, this was not part of their 
paper. FAO did not consider a shift to low input technology, or try to predict 
famines. 
Economic efficiency versus self-sufficiency represents a tradeoff of economic 
benefits. It was an F AO assumption that all countries would try to protect their 
present position regarding basic foods, hence the trend projection. Countries are 
often afraid of complete reliance on comparative advantage as a solution versus 
maintenance of a high degree of self-sufficiency. 
Large savings and investment projections were made considering a range of 
values, and considering agriculture in relation to the total economy. The authors 
felt that their projections were reasonable on the input side. Countries tend to 
underestimate the need for maintenance capital, which is probably equal to 40 
percent (not 20 percent as had been assumed) of needs. 
There is a mistaken concept of a strong cross price elasticity between energy 
and fertilizer prices; a recent World Bank study suggests that it is only 0.2. 
Fertilizer prices have been volatile because fertilizer has an inelastic demand, 
but it is not scarce, and capacity has increased. 
There is enough profit for farmers to purchase their share of energy inputs. 
Factor prices to agriculture have generally declined in real terms. As far as 
fixed resources are concerned, the world is using only half of total available 
arable land. 
On statistics, FAO does its best to deal with poor data. It utilizes an internal 
checking system, keeps supply and utilization tables crosschecked with nutri-
tional data, and does analysis on a country level. F AO started with 21 detailed 
studies. 
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Koester's Paper 
How could the EC do something for the developing countries on sugar without 
negative impacts on sugar exporters, especially other developing countries? 
There was comment on negative impacts of EC sugar policy and the Lome 
convention. The analysis ignores the loss to world exporters. It buys ACP 
goodwill but ignores GATT, gives a subsidy to EC producers, and substitutes 
domestic equity for international disequilibrium and harms developed and 
developing country exporters. 
In reply, Koester explained that the objective of the analysis was to look only 
at the impact on ACP countries. To consider all the issues raised would 
obviously require a much broader analysis. 
He disagreed that the EC has achieved internal equity for sugar producers. Its 
programmes lead to expansion of large producers and as a result benefits are 
distributed unevenly. He did not disagree with the attack on EC sugar policy, 
but it is an analyst's task to be objective. 
He could agree that EC grain policy which increases production may be of net 
benefit to developing countries since they are net grain importers. Sugar is an 
opposite case since cane is largely produced by developing countries. He 
concluded that external inequity should not be the price of domestic equity. 
Martin et al. 's Paper 
The Korean economy has been experiencing rapid growth which has inherent 
social problems. In the 1970s, the country had high rice support policies which 
they are trying with difficulty to correct. The country wishes to maintain 
economic growth. 
The theory of a country's comparative advantage depends on a free market 
solution, but if it cannot freely move labour and capital, a second best solution 
may be rational. The world free market price may not reflect the comparative 
advantage position of all countries. Is this a good criterion for formation of 
domestic policy? Noneconomic factors need to be considered. 
The authors replied that the points are well taken. The objective of the paper 
was not to reject comparative advantage but to suggest that it is not the final 
solution. Relative cost or efficiency is at best a difficult concept, and other 
noneconomic factors can have an impact. We need to understand the broad 
social milieu before criticizing policy. The Korea-U.S. bilateral perspective 
needs to start with an understanding of the Korean situation. Comparative 
advantage is a valuable concept but not the only one. 
Participants in the discussion included Yang-Boo Choe, D. Colman (Session 
Chairman), Graham Dalton, M. Leupolt, Don Paarlberg, D. Penny, B. F. Stanton, 
and Martin Upton. 
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